It\u2019s best to explain this calmly because, at first glance, there\u2019s nothing unusual about it. The agents were in training, conducting investigative work, and to do so, they were consulting public websites through a service called urlquery<\/b> (a tool that security analysts use to examine web pages). OpenAI summarizes its statement as follows: most of the activities were routine tasks, such as accessing public web content to answer questions. So far, nothing that any assistant wouldn\u2019t do with a web browser.<\/p>

The change <\/span>came<\/strong> in mid-June<\/span>. According to Asymmetric\u2019s timeline, on June 14, the agents first attempted to use urlquery with a private account; on the 18th, they succeeded; and on the 20th, they created a temporary email account on a service called Boomlify, which expires after forty-eight hours. They also used a notification service that deletes messages after twelve hours. As a result, there are records that investigators can no longer retrieve.<\/p>

Pippa Thompson, co-founder of Asymmetric, puts it very cautiously: \u201cIt\u2019s possible\u201d that the agents used these tools deliberately to cover their tracks<\/a>. She adds that these are techniques commonly used by human hackers.<\/p>

Keep in mind, though, that this isn’t the end of the world either. Asymmetric itself acknowledges that in the vast majority of cases, the data that was taken was public, and OpenAI insists that notifying an organization does not mean<\/a> that private information was accessed or that its system has been compromised. It has now launched a review of about fifty petabytes of data, which it says will take months.<\/p>

Months\u2014just to find out what its own agents did.<\/p>

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